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The stability of powergrid is crucial since its disruption affects systems ranging from street light-
ings to hospital life-support systems. Nevertheless, large blackouts are inevitable if powergrids are
in the state of self-organized criticality (SOC). In this paper, we introduce a simple model of evolv-
ing powergrid and establish its connection with the sandpile model, i.e. a prototype of SOC, and
earthquakes, i.e. a system considered to be in SOC. Various aspects are examined, including the
power-law distribution of blackout magnitudes, their inter-event waiting time, the predictability of
large blackouts, as well as the spatial-temporal rescaling of blackout data. We verified our observa-
tions on simulated networks as well as the IEEE 118-bus system, and show that both simulated and
empirical blackout waiting times can be rescaled in space and time similarly to those observed be-
tween earthquakes. Finally, we suggested proactive maintenance strategies to drive the powergrids
away from SOC to suppress large blackouts.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.20.-y, 89.20.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-organized criticality (SOC) corresponds to the
mechanism a system self-organizes itself to achieve a crit-
ical state between different phases in the long run. It was
first proposed by Bak et al in their seminal papers [1, 2] as
the mechanism underlying the characteristic 1/f power-
spectrum [3], self-similar fractal structures [4] as well
as power-laws [5], commonly observed in many differ-
ent natural and artificial systems, across an extensive
temporal and spatial scale [6]. Although alternative ap-
proaches have been suggested to produce similar phenom-
ena [5, 7, 8], SOC was considered by some researchers to
be the explanation for universal complexity in nature [9],
although this view is under strong debate [10].
Despite the strong debate, SOC has triggered tremen-
dous interest in various areas including physics, biol-
ogy, astronomy, geology and economics. Especially,
many systems in these areas exhibit a power-law dis-
tribution of fluctuations, spanning from minimal distur-
bances to system-wide extreme events [11]. These obser-
vations are consistent with those observed in the sandpile
model [1, 2], a prototype of SOC, in which the addition
of a single sand grain may lead to avalanches of any mag-
nitude following a power-law distribution. These similar-
ities have made sandpile model (as well as SOC) a good
analogy for explaining extreme events in the other sys-
tems, ranging from earthquakes [12] and forest fires [13]
on the earth to solar flares on the sun [14]; from mass
extinction events in ancient nature [15] to stock market
crashes in modern society [16].
∗chyeung@eduhk.hk
In this paper, we will examine another type of ex-
treme event which significantly impacts our daily life –
large blackouts caused by cascading failures in power-
grids [17]. As an example of their negative impact, the
large blackout in August, 2003 in USA contributed to 90
deaths [18] and was estimated to cost $6.4 billion [19].
Similar to other extreme events, blackouts were shown
to follow power-law size distributions [20] and SOC has
been suggested to be the underlying mechanism [21]. In
particular, the continual effort to satisfy the increasing
consumption by upgrading the powergrids incrementally
may have put it at a critical loading marginally before
the emergence of the phase with frequent blackouts, i.e.
the system is in SOC [21]. A model to demonstrate this
idea was recently introduced in [22]. Nevertheless, most
of these studies only focus on the power-law cascade size
distributions, while other phenomena and consequences
of powergrids as SOC systems are not examined.
The goal of this paper is to introduce a simple model
of an evolving powergrid, i.e. a powergrid which serves a
group of nodes with increasing energy demand, and up-
grades its capacity everytime after an overloading failure.
We will focus on the evolution of the powergrids beyond
the extensively studied individual cascading failures [23].
In addition to the cascade size distribution, we will ex-
amine the distribution of waiting time between blackouts,
the predictability of large blackouts as well as the spatial-
temporal rescaling of blackout data [12, 24]. We aim to
show the connection between our model and (i) real pow-
ergrids, (ii) the sandpile model and hence SOC, and (iii)
earthquakes (a potential candidate of SOC [12]); indirect
connections between these three systems are then estab-
lished. We tested our model on a real powergrid topology
of the IEEE 118-bus system and obtained similar results.
We also showed that real blackout data can be rescaled
2in space and time as we observed for earthquakes [24].
Finally, we examined various maintenance strategies and
their ability to suppress large blackouts by driving the
system away from SOC.
II. MODEL
We will introduce a model of evolving powergrid and
shows its connection with the sandpile model [1, 2].
Specifically, we consider a network with N nodes, labeled
by i = 1, . . . , N , where each node i is connected with ki
neighbors. Initially, a load Li is allocated to node i. A
fraction r of the nodes are considered as power stations
and are assigned with a negative infinite load. The rest
of the nodes are considered as energy consumers and are
assigned a random positive load, which follows a normal
distribution with a positive mean, truncated by discard-
ing the negative side. Each node i with a positive Li is
required to acquire a sufficient amount of power from the
power stations to satisfy its demand, i.e.
∑
j
AjiIji = Li, (1)
where Aji is the matrix element of the N ×N adjacency
matrix A, such that Aij = 1 if nodes i and j are con-
nected and otherwise, Aij = 0; the current Iji is the
power flow from node j to node i. We will implement
the model on square lattices and a real powergrid topol-
ogy.
To satisfy the demand of the consumer nodes, power is
transferred to them from the power plants via the power-
grid, composed of M transmission lines called links. We
adopt the direct current (DC) approximation and assume
that currents on the links minimize the resistive power∑
ij AijI
2
ijRij in transportation, where Rij is the resis-
tance on link (ij). To simplify the model, we assume
that Rij = 1 for all links, but the results can be easily
generalized to the case with Rij 6= 1. As shown in [25],
the optimal current can be computed by solving the po-
tential of each nodes, denoted as vi(t) for node i, given
by [25]
vi(t) = max

 1
ki

∑
j
Aijvj(t) + Li(t)

 , 0

 . (2)
Since Eq. (2) is a set of coupled equations involving a
node and its neighbors, one can solve for v’s for all nodes
by iterating the equations on the network until conver-
gence [25]. The optimal current Iij(t) from node j to
node i on a link (ij) is then given by Iij(t) = vi(t)−vj(t),
and Iij(t) = −Iji(t).
Since links are transmission lines which may break
when overloaded, we define the capacity of link (ij) to
be Cij(t) and consider that the link fails and no longer
transfers electricity if the current |Iij | > |Cij |. Initially
at time t = 0, the capacity Cij(0) of a link (ij) is defined
as
Cij(0) = (1 + α)Iij(0), (3)
where Iij(0) is the optimal current of the link at time
t = 0, while α is the ratio of excess capacity installed
in the network, which we call the redundancy ratio. The
capacity plays a role similar to the threshold in the sand-
pile model beyond which sands topple to the neighbor-
ing sites. Unlike the sandpile model, the capacity in the
powergrid evolves with time due to repairs after a failure,
given by
Cij(t+ 1) = (1 + α)I˜ij(t), (4)
where I˜ij(t) is the current which breaks the link. Ca-
pacities are heterogeneous across the network, which are
different from the homogeneous thresholds in other SOC
models such as the sandpile model, the OFC earthquake
model [26] and the powergrid model in [22]. Yet, as we
will see, this heterogeneity does not destroy criticality in
our model, unlike that observed in the OFC model [27].
To model the increase in the demand for electricity, we
randomly pick a consumer node at time t and increase
its demand by
Li(t) = Li(t− 1) + β〈Li(t− 1)〉, (5)
where 〈Li(t)〉 =
∑N
j=1 Lj(t)/N and β is the demand in-
crement ratio. This is analogous to the addition of sands
to the sandpile model. After each demand increment, the
new optimal currents are computed by iterating Eq. (2),
and links with currents exceeding the capacity are consid-
ered broken and removed from the powergrid. Currents
are then re-computed and new broken links are identi-
fied, leading to a cascading failure as shown in Fig. 1(a)
and (b); some nodes may become disconnected from the
powergrid as shown in Fig. 1(c). But unlike the sand-
pile model, a failed link may affect links other than the
nearest ones, as shown in the transition from Fig. 1(a)
through (c). The process repeats until no extra link
breaks, and all failed links are then repaired according
to Eq. (4). The whole cascading failure and repairs are
finished within one time step before the next demand in-
crement, which corresponds to a fast relaxation dynamics
intercepting a slow driving dynamics, an essential mecha-
nism in many SOC systems [9]. As the procedures repeat,
a series of cascading failures is observed. In this paper,
we call a failure a blackout regardless of its size.
To keep the model simple, we set α = β such that the
rates of load and capacity increment are equal. In this
case, the model only captures the most essential compo-
nents of the system to illustrate its relevance with SOC.
While capacities and loads monotonically increase, we
rescale all loads and capacities by the same factor after
a number of simulation time steps to keep all the vari-
ables finite; the dynamics between the variables does not
change since all equations involving loads and capacities
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FIG. 1: The dynamics of a cascading failure, or a blackout, in our model. Power stations and consumer nodes are denoted as
triangles and circles, respectively. Shaded circles correspond to consumer nodes which are disconnected from the power stations
due to the failed links. (a) A link in the network is broken after a demand increment. (b) and (c) Power transmitted by the
broken link is shared by the other links, which overload the other links to the same power station and render it isolated; the
load in the network are now shared by the remaining power stations, leading to failures in areas away from the initially failed
link. (d) The end of the cascade and all the failed links in this single blackout.
are linear. Since we will focus on the SOC phenomenon
in this paper, the analyses of the system behaviors with
different α are given in the Appendix C.
III. RESULTS
A. Self-organized criticality in the model powergrid
To show that our powergrid model exhibits the char-
acteristics of a critical state, we first examine the distri-
bution of cascade size, measured as the total number of
broken links in a failure. As shown in Fig. 2, the cas-
cade size follows a power-law distribution similar to the
empirical results [21]. Although different tails are ob-
served for cases with different model parameter α, we
remark that a universal power-law exponent is observed
with α spanning two order of magnitudes from 0.01 to
3.2, which emerges from self-organization without fine-
tuning, suggesting universality independent of model pa-
rameters. On the other hand, as shown in the inset of
Fig. 2, the cascade size distributions for different sys-
tem sizes also follow power-laws with the same exponent
where the cutoff increases with system size, suggesting
scale invariance typical of critical systems.
To further examine the criticality of our powergrid
model, we compute the distribution of waiting time T
between consecutive failures. Since avalanches in SOC
systems are unpredictable, their waiting time distribu-
tions should follow an exponential decay, though it is not
common to use merely the exponential waiting time dis-
tribution to justify SOC [28–30]. As shown in the semi-
log plot in Fig. 3(a), the waiting time distributions for
the cases with different α follow an exponential decay.
The distributions in log-log plot in Fig. 3(b) show that
they resemble the empirical results observed in real pow-
ergrids [21], and earthquakes [24] except a more promi-
nent power-law at the small time scale contributed by
the correlated aftershocks after a main shock described
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FIG. 2: The distribution of cascade size, i.e. the total num-
ber of broken links in each failure, obtained on L× L square
lattices with L = 30 and N = L2 = 900 nodes, with 5% of the
nodes to be power station. The statistics is obtained for at
least N×2×103 updates after an equilibration of N×102 up-
dates. Inset: The distributions of cascade size with different
system size N with α = 0.05.
by the Omori’s Law [31]. After-blackouts do not occur
in our model and instead, failures occur less frequently
after a large blackout since a large number of links were
repaired simultaneously.
To examine the predictability of the occurrence and
the size of blackouts, we analyze the sequence of waiting
times and cascade sizes by detrended fluctuation analysis
(DFA); detailed description of DFA is found in the Ap-
pendix A. As shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, the behavior of
the sequence of waiting times and cascade sizes is anal-
ogous to that of the corresponding reshuffled sequence
when a small number of consecutive blackouts are con-
sidered. This implies that the exact behavior of blackout
occurrence is unpredictable in the short time scale. On
the other hand, the behavior of the sequences deviates
from that of the reshuffled one when a large number of
4consecutive blackouts are considered; it implies that the
emergence of blackouts become more predictable in the
long run, e.g. a large blackout or a long waiting time
emerges when a sufficiently long sequence of blackouts is
considered. Nevertheless, the larger the system size, the
longer the time scale which is consistent with the reshuf-
fled results, implying a lower predictability in larger sys-
tems.
Stimulated by the DFA results, we examine the pres-
ence of blackout precursors. We first divide the time
between consecutive pairs of large blackouts into a fixed
number of divisions, and compute statistics within each
division to identify potential trends. As shown in
Fig. 4(a), the failure rate increases and drops before the
emergence of medium blackouts with size s ≥ 0.1M and
s ≥ 0.3M , where M is the total number of links, which
may signal an insufficient relaxation of energy before the
blackouts. On the other hand, the failure rate increases
continuously before blackouts of size s ≥ 0.5M , which
may be caused by a sequence of medium-sized blackouts
(suggested by the large average blackout size) relaxing
energy incompletely, and finally triggered by a sequence
of small but more frequent blackouts, indicating a close-
to-critical state of the system.
Nevertheless, Fig. 4(a) shows the average failure rate
while individual events may be unpredictable by just ex-
amining the preceding sequence of blackouts. Prediction
may instead be possible if the microscopic information of
the system is available. To examine this predictability, we
define the load factor of link (ij) to be F(ij) = |Iij |/Cij ,
and compute the average network load factor F given by
F =
1
M
∑
(ij)
Fij =
1
M
∑
(ij)
|Iij |
Cij
. (6)
A small value of F implies a large amount of redun-
dant capacity and failures are less likely. As shown
in Fig. 4(b), F increases between two large blackouts,
and a high F may be a signal for coming large fail-
ures. These results suggest that prediction is difficult
given only macroscopic information, e.g. the sequence
of failures, but may be possible if microscopic informa-
tion in the system is available. This is analogous to the
predictability of earthquakes suggested in [32].
As suggested by [1, 2, 10], spatio-temporal correlation
is an important feature of SOC systems since it connects
the dynamical self-organization with spatial criticality.
To examine this correlation, we consider a l× l partition
(details are shown in Appendix B), and define PS,l(T )
to be the waiting time distribution within the partition
between blackouts with size s > S. As shown in Fig. 5(a),
an increase in the cutoff size S (or a decrease in partition
size l) makes the distributions wider, compared to the
original PS=1,l=20(T ). Hence, it is interesting to examine
if the statistics of large failures in large partitions are
equivalent to those of small failures in small partitions.
We follow the analyses of earthquakes in [12], and plot
the rescaled distributions T γPS,l(T ) as a function of the
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FIG. 3: The distributions of waiting time between consecu-
tive blackouts of size s ≥ 1, obtained on an instance of L×L
square lattice with L = 30 and N = L2 = 900 nodes, with 5%
of the nodes to be power stations, in (a) semi-log plot and (b)
log-log plot. The statistics is obtained for N × 104 updates
after an equilibration of N × 102 updates. To better show
the form of the distributions, log-bins are used to obtain the
distributions.
rescaled waiting time x = TS−bldf in Fig. 5(b), such
that PS,l(T ) with various S and l collapse onto the same
function f(x), i.e.
T γPS,l(T ) = f(TS
−bldf ). (7)
As suggested in [12], γ, b and df corresponds to the ex-
ponents of the Omori’s Law, the exponent of the cumu-
lative distribution of shock magnitude (i.e. the exponent
of Gutenberg-Richter Law [33]), and the fractal dimen-
sion of earthquakes, respectively. In our case, γ = 1.07,
b = 0.54 and df = 1.5, and the value −b− 1 is consistent
with the exponent ≈ −1.54 in the blackout size distri-
bution in Fig. 2, consistent with relation suggested by
Bak et al for empirical earthquake data [12]. This data
collapse in Fig. 5(b) suggests that waiting times between
blackouts in our model can be rescaled in spatial and
temporal dimension, again suggesting universality, and
is similar to that observed for earthquakes.
To further examine the universality of blackout wait-
ing time in our model, we follow an alternative form of
rescaling proposed by [24]. By drawing again an analogy
with earthquakes, the distributions PS,l(T ) with various
S and l for blackouts collapse onto the function g(x) as
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FIG. 4: (a) We divide the duration between consecutive
pairs of large blackouts into 20 divisions and compute the
failure rate within each division averaged over different pairs
of large blackouts with size s ≥ 0.1M , 0.3M and 0.5M . The
size of the nodes corresponds to the average blackout size
in that particular division. The results are averaged over 27
realizations of L×L square lattice with L = 30 and N = L2 =
900 nodes, with 5% of the nodes being power stations. The
statistics is obtained for N×104 updates after an equilibration
of N × 102 updates. (b) The corresponding average network
load factor F given by Eq. (6).
shown in Fig. 5(c), i.e.
R−1S,lPS,l(T ) = g(RS,lT ), (8)
where RS,l is the average blackout frequency in the par-
tition. The two data collapses in Fig. 5(b) and (c) may
suggest that scale invariance and universality emerge in
our model of powergrid, resembling those observed for
earthquakes [12, 24]. All the above results suggest that
our powergrid model results in a realistic blackout statis-
tics as well as the characteristics of self-organized criti-
cality.
IV. SOC ON REAL POWERGRIDS
To examine the robustness of the SOC phenomenon
against network topology, we implement our model on
the IEEE 118-bus system, which represents a portion of
the American Electric Power System in the Midwestern
US as of December, 1962 [34]. Before the simulation
starts, we assign a load Li to each consumer node i ac-
cording to its load given in [34]; power stations are as-
signed with an infinite amount of resources. The sys-
tem then follows the same dynamics described in our
model. As shown in Fig. 6(a), the cascade size distribu-
tion roughly follows a power-law with the same exponent
observed on square lattices. The waiting time distribu-
tion is also similar to those observed on square lattices
and empirical results [21]. These suggest that SOC be-
haviors may also emerge on real powergrid topologies fol-
lowing our model dynamics.
To further examine the robustness of the SOC behav-
iors in the IEEE 118-bus system, we re-allocate the power
stations randomly and examine the system behaviors.
As shown in Fig. 6(a), the distribution of failures still
roughly follows a power-law but large failures are more
likely. These results show that powergrid failures are
more strongly dependent on the location of power sta-
tions than the topology of the system. With an appro-
priate allocation of power stations, large failures are more
suppressed since the original load from a broken link can
be shared evenly to the other links. Unlike the sandpile
model composed of all identical nodes, power stations in
powergrids play a crucial role and their locations impact
the system behaviors. Nevertheless, regardless of the lo-
cation of the power stations, the system still shows a
general picture consistent with SOC.
In addition to the simulations on a real powergrid
topology, we also examine the spatial-temporal rescaling
using the empirical data of waiting times, obtained from
the data spanning 15 years of power outages across the
United State [35]. Since the data do not show the fail-
ure of individual links in a blackout, we cannot identify
blackouts according to partitions as in [12] (see Appendix
B), but the rescaling according to Eq. (8) by the average
failure rate is feasible [24]. As shown in Fig. 6(b), the
rescaled waiting time distributions with different cutoff
size S overlap on a common function, similar to those
observed in simulations in Fig. 5(c). This again suggests
that the empirical results are consistent with the simu-
lated results, and SOC is a potential mechanism under-
lying real powergrids.
V. ESCAPING SOC BY PROACTIVE
MAINTENANCE
If a powergrid is in SOC, large blackouts and their neg-
ative impacts [18, 19] are inevitable. As we have seen,
the system does not escape form SOC by repairing the
broken links after failures, instead this mechanism leads
to criticality. Compared with the non-controllable earth
crust movement underlying earthquakes, powergrids are
composed of controllable components, and therefore, to
avoid large blackouts, one can implement microscopic in-
terventions to drive the system away from SOC. In addi-
tion to the remedial repairs, we will explore three proac-
tive maintenance approaches to increase link capacity in
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FIG. 5: (a) The distribution PS,l(T ) of waiting time T between consecutive failures with size s ≥ S in a l × l partition of
the network, for different values of S and l. (b) The data collapse of all the distributions in (a) by plotting T γPS,l(T ) as a
function of x = TS−bldf , suggested in [12] for earthquakes, with γ = 1.07, b = 0.54 and df = 1.5. (c) The data collapse of
all the distributions in (a) by plotting R−1S,lPS,l(T ) as a function of the rescaled waiting time x = RS,lT , suggested in [24] for
earthquakes, where RS,l is the average event rate with size s ≥ S in the partition of size l. The results are obtained on L× L
square lattices with L = 20 and N = L2 = 400 nodes, with 5% of the nodes to be power stations. The statistics is obtained for
N × 3× 105 updates after an equilibration of N × 102 updates.
advance of large failures:
1. Maintenance based on the global load factor - at
each step without failure, given the average net-
work load factor F is larger than a threshold ψ,
i.e. F > ψ (see Eq. (6)), the capacity of the
link with the highest individual load factor, i.e.
the link (ij) = argmax(ij)[F(ij)], is upgraded by
C′ij(t) = Cij(t)(1 + α); the above procedure is re-
peated within a time step until F < ψ;
2. Maintenance based on local load factors - at each
step without failure, we increase the capacity of all
links (ij) if their load factor exceeds the threshold
ψ, i.e. to upgrade C′ij(t) =
Iij(t)
ψ
when F(ij) > ψ,
so that F(ij) falls to ψ;
3. Routine maintenance - the capacities of the n links
with the highest load factor are upgraded by Cij(t+
1) = Cij(t)(1 + α).
We first discuss the results of the first approach. As
shown by the blue () and green (©) curves respectively
in Fig. 7(a), for ψ < 0.2, a large amount of extra capac-
ity is required in proactive maintenance, but only a small
amount of extra capacity is required to repair the bro-
ken links since blackouts are rare as shown in Fig. 7(c);
the system escapes from SOC. When ψ increases from
ψ = 0.2 to ψ = 0.25, less extra capacity is required for
maintenance but more capacity is used for repairing the
failed links. Beyond ψ ≈ 0.25, the amount of extra ca-
pacity required for proactive maintenance almost van-
ishes, which indicates that the global load factor F sel-
dom reaches ψ to activate the proactive procedures; this
may also mark the typical load factor which triggers the
failures. The system returns to SOC and further reduces
to the original no-maintenance case when ψ → 1.
Interestingly, compared with the original case without
maintenance (i.e. ψ → 1), (i) the total amount of ex-
tra capacity required for all interventions (i.e. proactive
maintenance or remedial repairs) is less and attains a
minimum at ψ ≈ 0.2, and (ii) at the same time failures
are less frequent, as shown in Fig. 7(a) and (c) respec-
tively. It is because maintenance leads to an even distri-
bution of redundant capacity, compared with the biased
distribution of excessive capacity on individual heavily
loaded links after failures. However, a large number of
maintenance is required in this approach as shown in
Fig. 7(b), resulting in a trade-off between the required
amount of extra capacity and the required number of in-
terventions (i.e. the total number of maintenance and
repairs) to sustain the system as shown in Fig. 8.
We then discuss the second and the third maintenance
approach. As shown in Fig. 7(d) - (f), the second ap-
proach behaves similarly as the first approach, except
that a much larger number of interventions (mainly main-
tenance) are required in exchange for a smaller amount
of extra required capacity (see also Fig. 8). On the other
hand, as shown in Fig. 7(g) and (h), the third approach
requires only a small amount of extra capacity achieved
by a small number of interventions, outperforming both
the first and the second approach. Nevertheless, it is less
effective in eliminating failures as shown Fig. 7(i) unless
n & 3 at which much more extra capacity are required. A
better comparison is shown in Fig. 8, where the third ap-
proach - a simple routine maintenance - is the most cost-
effective approach to drive the system away from SOC.
In summary, all three approaches suppress blackouts and
at the same time use less extra capacity compared with
the original case without proactive maintenance.
We remark that powergrids with proactive mainte-
nance may share similarities with the non-conserving
variants of SOC models [13, 26], in which the SOC char-
acteristics are lost. While the former extends capacity
in advance to suppress blackouts, the latter dismisses a
fraction of energy during toppling to suppress avalanches,
leading to subcritical behaviors in both kinds of sys-
tems [36, 37]. As a result, proactive maintenance are
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the original location and random location, respectively. The
statistics is obtained for N×104 updates after an equilibrium
of N × 102 updates. Inset: The waiting time distributions of
the two cases. (b) The rescaled waiting time distributions of
the 15-year data of power outages across the United State [35],
R−1S PS(T ) as a function of the rescaled waiting times x =
RST , where RS is the average occurrence rate of failure of
size greater than S. Inset: The waiting time distributions of
the 15-years data of power outages across the United State
with failure of size s > S.
effective to suppress large failures since they drive the
system away from SOC.
VI. DISCUSSION
Powergrids were suggested to be in self-organized crit-
icality (SOC). To verify the conjecture, we introduced
a model of powergrids which constantly evolves and up-
grades to satisfy the increasing energy demand, resulting
in a dynamics of intermitten failures and recovery. The
model demonstrates various SOC characteristics and an
analogy to earthquakes. Some of these findings are ver-
ified by implementation on real powergrid topology and
empirical data. The model behaviors and the data analy-
ses provide further evidences to suggest that an evolving
powergrid is in SOC.
If powergrids are in SOC, what are the consequences?
Large blackouts are inevitable and unpredictable. Since
they have a great negative impact, it is essential to sup-
press them, and the way to achieve the goal is to drive the
system away from SOC, or otherwise it self-organizes to
criticality again. Unlike earthquakes which involve the
non-controllable earth crust, powergrids are composed
of controllable components; intervention may greatly in-
crease the predictability and controllability of blackouts.
Several proactive maintenance approaches are suggested
in additional to the ordinary remedial repairs, and are
shown to be effective in suppressing SOC and large black-
outs. While the present study focuses on powergrids, its
strong connection with SOC would make the results rel-
evant to other SOC systems, especially in terms of con-
trollability.
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APPENDIX A: Detrended fluctuation analysis
We employ the detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA)
[38, 39] to examine the long term memory, i.e. persis-
tence or anti-persistence, of the sequence of waiting time
between blackouts, and the size of the blackouts. Given
a time series x(i), with i = 1, 2, · · · , N , we first define
the cumulative sequence yi to be
y(i) =
i∑
j=1
(x(j)− 〈x〉), (9)
where i = 1, 2, · · · , n, and 〈x〉 is the expected value for
the whole sequence x(i), given by
〈x〉 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
x(i). (10)
We then divide the whole sequence into ⌊N
n
⌋ time win-
dow of equal size n. In each time window, we best-fit
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power stations. The statistics is obtained for N × 102 updates after an equilibration of N × 104 updates.
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blackouts.
the cumulative sequence in the window with a l-th order
polynomial function yfit(i) given by
yfit(i) =
l∑
k=0
βki
k (11)
where βk’s are the coefficient of the polynomial, and
yfit(i) is thus the local trend in the window. We call the
analyses l-DFA given an l-th order polynomial is used as
the fit.
We then compute the detrended fluctuation function
F(n) for time window length n, by detrending the cumu-
lative sequence, i.e. subtracting y(t) in each window by
the corresponding local trend yfit(i), i.e.
z(i) = y(i)− yfit(i). (12)
For each window length n , we calculate the root-mean-
square deviation from the trend as the detrended fluctu-
ation function F(n), given by
F(n) =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(z(i))2. (13)
We denote the average of F(n) over the different time
window to be 〈F(n)〉. By repeating the above processes
for different values of n = 2k, with k = 1, . . . , we obtain a
relation between 〈F(n)〉 and n. For a power-law relation
〈F(n)〉 ∝ nD, the sequence is random if D = 0.5, anti-
persistent if D < 0.5, and persistent if D > 0.5.
To examine the predictability of blackouts, we per-
formed 0-DFA on the sequences of waiting times and
the size of blackouts, and compare these results to the
corresponding sequences after random reshuffling, i.e. a
random re-order of the individual entry of the sequences.
If there are no pattern on the sequences, the exponent
D should be consistent with those of the reshuffled se-
quences, and the waiting times and the size of blackouts
9are unpredictable. On the other hand, if the the expo-
nent D differs from that of the reshuffled sequence, then
there are predictability in the sequences, i.e. either the
sequences are persistent or anti-persistence. We remark
that 1-DFA and 2-DFA were also performed and the re-
sults obtained are similar to those of 0-DFA, and thus we
only present the results from 0-DFA.
Figure S9 shows Fwaiting(n) as a function of n ob-
tained by 0-DFA for the sequence of the waiting times.
Interestingly, Fwaiting(n) seems to be characterized by
two different power-laws. When n is small (n = 22 to
25 for L = 20, n = 22 to 26 for L = 30 and n = 22 to
27 for L = 40), D = 0.48, 0.49, 0.52 for L = 20, 30, 40
respectively, consistent with the corresponding reshuf-
fled sequences. This implies that for a short sequence
of blackouts, the waiting times are random and unpre-
dictable. However, for a longer sequence of waiting times
(n = 26 to 216 for L = 20, n = 27 to 216 for L = 30
and n = 28 to 216 for L = 40), D deviates from those of
the reshuffled sequences and become 0.88, 0.86, 0.85 for
L = 20, 30, 40 respectively. This suggests that persis-
tence exists if we consider a long sequence of blackouts,
i.e. there is a long waiting time which may be a conse-
quence of a large blackout given a sufficiently long time.
Moreover, the exponent D changes abruptly, separating
an unpredictable range (D ≈ 0.5) from a predictable
range (D > 0.5). As we can see from Fig. 9, the larger the
system size, the larger the values of n where the system
remains unpredictable, implying a lower predictability in
larger systems.
Similar to waiting times, we performed 0-DFA on
the sequence of blackout sizes. As shown in Fig. 10,
Fcascade(n) is consistent with the corresponding reshuf-
fled sequences at small n (n = 22 to 23 for L = 20, n = 22
to 24 for L = 30 and L = 40), where D = 0.79, 0.87, 0.87
for L = 20, 30, 40 respectively. This implies a persistent
behavior in the sequence of blackout size, which may be
a consequence of the memory in the loading factor, i.e.
the network loading increases gentlely which leads to con-
secutive blackouts of similar size. We remark that such
persistence is also observed for the reshuffled sequence,
since small blackouts are much more common (see Fig. 2).
For the intermediate range of n (n = 24 to 27 for L = 20,
n = 25 to 28 for L = 30 and L = 40), D = 0.30, 0.26, 0.25
for L = 20, 30, 40 respectively, suggesting a slight anti-
persistence. This may come from the cycle of blackouts,
where large blackouts are usually followed by a period
of small blackouts, due to the extensive repairing after
a large blackout. Finally, at large n (n = 28 to 216 for
L = 20, n = 29 to 216 for L = 30 and L = 40), D in-
creases again and becomes 0.83, 0.82, 0.81 respectively for
L = 20, 30, 40, suggesting the occurrence of a large black-
out given a sufficiently long time. Finally, the larger the
system size, the larger the values of n where the system
remains unpredictable, similar to that observed for wait-
ing times.
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FIG. 9: Fwaiting(n) as a function of time window length n,
for the original and the reshuffled sequence of waiting times
for different system size L.
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APPENDIX B: Partition for spatio-temporal
rescaling of waiting time distribution
FIG. 11: A partition of size l× l in a network with size L×L.
To examine the spatio-temporal relation of the occur-
rence of blackouts in our model, we follow [12] to rescale
the waiting time distribution. We first group the nodes in
the network into square partitions of size l× l, as shown
in Fig. 11. We then define the constituent links of a parti-
tion to be those with both terminal nodes located inside
the partition. Since there is no epicentre in blackouts,
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we consider a failure has occurred in a partition when at
least one of its constituent links breaks; the size of the
failure is defined by the number of failed links within the
partition. The waiting time in a partition is defined to
be the time between consecutive failures in the partition.
We further define a cutoff size S such that only the wait-
ing time between failures with size greater than or equal
to S is considered. Finally, we denote the waiting time
distribution in a l× l partition with a cutoff size S to be
PS,l(T ), such that PS,l(T ) with various S and l collapse
onto the same function given by Eq. (7). The original
and the rescaled distributions are shown in Fig. 5 (a)
and (b).
APPENDIX C: Waiting time as a function of
Redundancy ratio
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FIG. 12: The average waiting time as a function of α, ob-
tained on L×L square lattices with L = 30 and N = L2 = 900
nodes, with r = 45 of the nodes to be power station. The
statistics is obtained for 1 × 106 updates after an equilibra-
tion of 1× 105 updates.
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FIG. 13: The expected value of the average network load
factor as a function of α, obtained on L × L square lattices
with L = 30 and N = L2 = 900 nodes, with r = 45 of
the nodes to be power station. The statistics is obtained for
N × 102 updates after an equilibration of N × 104 updates.
We will discuss the waiting time between two failures
as a function of the redundancy ratio α. As shown in
Fig. 12, the average waiting time starts at a high value
at the smallest α, decreases with α, suggesting that the
failure rate decreases with α. As shown in Fig. 13, the
average network load factor 〈F 〉 (see Eq. (6)) increases
as α increases, in a trend opposite to that of the average
waiting time. These results imply that at the smallest
α value, failures are less frequent since the demand in-
crements are more gentle and the average network load
factor 〈F 〉 stays at a low value for a large amount of
time. Increasing α in this regime would increase 〈F 〉,
which leads to an increase of failure rate, and hence a
decrease in the average waiting time.
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